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Abstract 
 
 
 
Fertility rates in most developed societies have been declining at younger ages and rising 
at older ages. This phenomenon is widely referred to as reflecting the postponement of 
fertility. But is this an accurate description? The paper considers whether recent changes 
in the age-pattern of childbearing in France can be described as postponement. The 
statistical features of time series of rates are distinguished from the underlying 
behavioural process generating these. Criteria for the presence of postponement are 
proposed. In the absence of detailed, longitudinal information on intentions, the 
occurrence or otherwise of postponement is assessed by indirect means. Some evidence is 
found consistent with fertility postponement in recent decades. However, it cannot be 
interpreted causally, and so cannot be used either to explain recent trends or to anticipate 
future trends. Much more detailed evidence is required to establish the existence of 
postonement in the behavioural sense than is generally assumed.   
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There appear to be at least three requirements for giving an accurate account of fertility 
trends. First, we must have appropriate measures of fertility change through time. By 
appropriate, we mean measures that are both demographically precise and reflect behavioural 
elements that could be the focus for explanatory inquiry. Second, we require interpretations of 
such movements that are not only plausible but subject, in principle, to empirical test. Third, 
the mechanisms implied by such interpretative ideas need to be specified precisely and tested 
against evidence – that is, identifying the impact that particular mechanisms would have on 
time-trends in closely specified rates, as distinct from an overall total fertility rate. Of course, 
well-documented theory is the ultimate goal, but in the current state of demography and the 
social sciences generally, identifying possible behavioural mechanisms driving shorter- or 
longer-term trends, and testing them against evidence, seems a more realistic aim.  
Recent decades have seen substantial progress in methods of measuring fertility, particularly 
with the rediscovery and diffusion of the period parity progression approach to fertility 
measurement, originally due to Henry (Henry 1953, Ní Bhrolcháin 1987, Feeney and Yu, 
1987, Hoem 1993a, Rallu and Toulemon 1994, Andersson 1999, 2002). These methods have 
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been used to provide a more precise description of fertility trends in developed countries in 
the 50+ years since the Second World War. However, progress has been slower in identifying 
processes and mechanisms of fertility change, and documenting these by reference to the 
detail and location in time of fertility rates measured in these more refined ways. The 
outstanding example of a case in which such a mechanism has been identified and 
documented is the demonstration by Hoem (1990, 1993b) that the increase in fertility rates, 
differentially higher at short durations after the previous birth, around 1975-1986 in Sweden 
was probably attributable to accelerated childbearing motivated by changes in the regulations 
associated with financial provision for maternity leave in Sweden. Andersson (1999) shows 
further that the disproportionately higher increases in second and third birth rates at short 
durations continued well into the 1990s. We have in that case a phenomenon well 
documented by time-series of parity- and duration-specific fertility rates, interpreted as 
reflecting accelerated childbearing, an interpretation backed up by the fit between the detail of 
the maternity leave provisions and the detail and precise behaviour in time of the parity- and 
duration-specific rates. Hoem did not attempt to present a theory to account for the fertility 
movements involved – his was an interpretation which specified a behavioural mechanism 
and provided evidence to back up the existence of such a mechanism. Nor would the evidence 
meet strict criteria for establishing a causal effect. Nevertheless, the evidence presented is 
probably the nearest we have to a documentation of a causal mechanism at the root of short-
run fertility trends in a modern developed society, leaving aside fertility around war-time, the 
mechanical effect of the sudden restriction of abortion in 1966 in Romania on subsequent 
birth rates in 1967-1970 and the years of the fire-horse in Japan (not quite so mechanical a 
phenomenon but very short lived). If demography accumulates enough and sufficiently well-
documented instances of the kind presented by Hoem, sensible theory may ultimately be built 
inductively, an approach that we would favour.     3
In broad outline the last 50 years of developed country fertility saw first an increase in 
marriage and fertility rates to the late 1950s/early 1960s – the baby boom – and subsequently 
a decline in these from the mid 1960s early 1970s. Interpretations of these trends have been 
many and varied, but there have been few attempts to tie down such interpretations to the 
detail of the fertility rates and surrounding (candidate) causal environment that are as focussed 
as the Swedish case in the late 1970s-1990s. For the last two to three decades, since the mid- 
to late-70s, fertility trends in the developed world have been displaying a new and distinctive 
pattern. Rates have been declining at younger ages and rising at older ages. This is true both 
of basic age-specific rates and also, as we will see presently, of age-parity specific rates. This 
phenomenon has been widely interpreted as reflecting a “postponement” of fertility, rather 
than that the average number of births per woman is declining. Is this interpretation correct? 
The proposition that women and/or couples have recently been “postponing” childbearing is 
not self-evidently true. It is an empirical statement and so could be false. Describing the 
trends in this way may be perfectly reasonable in a journalistic context, and is certainly 
intelligible in a personal and social sense. But what evidence supports the interpretation? 
Leaving aside its journalistic utility and personal plausibility is it, in fact, a scientific 
statement? How do we test its empirical validity? The present paper makes an initial approach 
to evaluating empirically whether, in the case of France, it is correct to interpret the fertility 
trends of the last few decades as reflecting postponement of childbearing.  
Why should this issue matter? The question whether developed countries in recent decades 
have been experiencing fertility postponement matters for several reasons. From an applied 
perspective, it has practical implications for population projection: clearly, more realistic 
scenarios can be formulated in relation to future trends if we have solid information on the 
presence or absence in the recent past of links between trends at different ages. Beyond   4
practical purposes are academic concerns: descriptive and interpretative accuracy and 
appropriateness matter in any science, particularly since they influence thinking about and 
investigation of underlying causes. If recent trends do, indeed, reflect a postponement 
phenomenon this implies that the downward trend in fertility rates at younger ages and the 
upward trend at older ages have a common cause – one which is, furthermore, capable of 
having a long-term effect in individuals’ lives. If not, however, declines in fertility rates at 
younger ages may be occurring for reasons that are entirely unconnected with those 
influencing the rises at older ages. The differing trends at younger and older ages may be 
connected with each other, as the postponement idea implies, or, alternatively, the decline in 
rates at young ages may be quite unrelated – or only weakly related – to the rising rates at 
older ages. If this is so, then the divergence between the trends at younger and older ages is 
not a single, integral phenomenon. Thus, the forces driving down fertility rates at younger 
ages may have no relationship at all with the factors determining the increase in fertility rates 
at older ages. It would be very useful, for both practical and academic purposes, to know. 
Before delving in more detail into the issue of postponement, and what it might mean in 
concrete terms, we consider an alternative way of describing, in words, the differential trends 
by age in fertility seen in recent decades. We could interpret the diverging trends by age by 
saying that the last 25 years or so have seen a change in the age pattern of childbearing, a shift 
towards later ages in the age-specific fertility schedule. There can be no disputing this – the 
age specific fertility schedule has unquestionably shifted along the age axis, with fertility 
schedules peaking at later ages currently than has been true in the recent past. This is seen in 
Figures 1a and 1b for France, with Figure 1a presenting the absolute age-specific fertility 
rates and Figure 1b, the age-specific schedules standardised to sum to 1, so as to abstract from 
the overall level of fertility. From the late 1940s to the mid 1970s there was a decided change   5
in the shape of the fertility schedule, with an increase in fertility at younger ages and a decline 
at older ages, inrelative terms. During this period the mean age at childbirth declined, for two 
reasons: on the one hand, a decrease in the mean age at the birth of the first child and, on the 
other, a decline in the number of high order births, and with a narrowing of the range of ages 
at childbearing. From the mid-1970s to the present, the overall shape of the curve is relatively 
stable, but it moves along the age axis, with a corresponding increase in the mean age at first 
birth, and with the distribution of births by order remaining the same (Toulemon and Mazuy 
2001). The standardised mean age of childbearing rose by 2.7 years in France (26.5 to 29.2) 
between 1977 and 1997. Saying that the age-schedule of childbearing has shifted is an 
accurate and uncontroversial description of the statistical patterns. But how far does such a 
description get us in explanatory terms? Not far, we believe. The reason is that we have no 
behavioural model to account for the characteristic shape of the age-specific fertility schedule. 
A unimodal distribution of age-specific fertility rates is universal to all known populations, 
with variations through time and in space in the peak age of childbearing, and some variation 
in the shape of the schedule. But we have no well-founded behavioural explanation for this 
pattern. Lacking an empirically verified behavioural model that could explain why and how 
cross-sectional fertility schedules behave as they do (the same is true of cohort fertility by 
age), stating that the fertility schedule has shifted along the age axis does not give us any 
pointers as to how to explain the shift. Nevertheless, though not providing us with explanatory 
clues, a description of recent trends as a shift in the age-pattern of childbearing has the 
inestimable scientific merit that it does not carry any implications regarding untested 
explanatory propositions. It is an accurate description without implicit explanatory baggage: it 
is not an interpretative Trojan horse while an account in terms of postponement may be.    6
Personal experience and scientific subject matter are intermingled in demography, as in the 
other social sciences, and so there are reasons for worrying that our scientific judgement and 
perspective can be subverted, biased and weakened by personal involvement in – whether 
actual, associational, or empathic – the processes and phenomena we attempt to represent 
scientifically. It seems advisable therefore to do what we can to disengage from the natural 
plausibility of such ideas as postponement of childbearing as an explanation of differential 
fertility movements by age while investigating empirically whether the postponement 
interpretation fits. What evidence is relevant to deciding whether it is an accurate 
representation of recent fertility trends? 
Hajnal (1947) is the originator in modern demography of both the cohort approach to fertility 
analysis and of the idea of postponement as underlying sharp, short-term, compensating 
movements in period fertility rates at differing ages/durations of marriage. He defines 
postponement as occurring when there is a “fall in fertility rates balanced by a subsequent rise 
so that the size of the family remains relatively constant...” (Hajnal, 1947: 151). He goes on to 
remark that the participants in a postponement phenomenon need not “have the idea clearly in 
their minds that they will later have the children they are “postponing”’ (ibid: 151). Frejka 
and Calot (2001) adopt Hajnal’s version of the concept and describe it as a “formal 
demography” definition of postponement
2. We do not believe that this is a defensible 
definition of postponement, which must, if it means anything at all, imply human agency and 
intention at some level. Nor can it be considered a “formal demography” definition of the 
concept. If we require a term that refers purely to short term fluctuations in fertility rates that 
compensate for each other, a neutral, statistical term is required that implies nothing about the 
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underlying mechanisms: such terms as tempo or timing changes or change in the age pattern 
of fertility fit the bill in this respect. Hajnal’s innovative concept was important because it 
drew attention to the existence of short-term fluctuations in period fertility – to the volatility 
of period fertility – and to the absurdity of interpreting a single year’s or short period’s 
fertility as an indicator of long-run prospects. However, 50 years later, it is time to be more 
rigorous in our terminology and defining as postponement a purely statistical feature of 
fertility rates appears to us to be both unnecessary and potentially very misleading.  
As we see it, postponement is a behavioural hypothesis that could, in principle, explain 
particular statistical features of time trends in fertility and other demographic rates; essentially 
the postponement idea posits a (causal) link between an initial decline in fertility at younger 
ages and a subsequent increase at older ages. Such a link could also be present for reasons 
other than postponement. The position at its simplest can be viewed as in the following table 
setting out the various possible combinations of, on the one hand, events in the statistical-
demographic domain and, on the other, underlying behavioural processes. Thus when declines 
in rates occur at younger ages, rises in rates at older ages may or may not subsequently occur 
to offset these. Where declines at younger ages are followed by rising rates at older ages, the 
combination may be attributable to an underlying behavioural process describable as 
postponement, or it could be due to e.g. a once-for-all medium-term shift in the structure by 
age of opportunities and incentives for childbearing. In this context, we would suggest that 
postponement is seen as a short -term phenomenon, a temporary change that is not the result of 
a fundamental shift in childbearing customs, while a more permanent change in the age 
pattern of childbearing is described otherwise. A final possibility is that the divergent trends 
at different ages may be due to quite unrelated factors (table 1).  
                                                                                                                                                             
up at more advanced ages so as to equal or surpass the completed cohort fertility of women born earlier” (Frejka 
and Calot, 2001, p126).   8
  Table1 
Statistical -demographic sequence of 
events  
A decline in rates occurs at younger ages. 
At older ages rates: 
 
 
 
Behavioural process 
subsequently rise  do not later rise 
 
Women/men/couples postpone 
childbearing 
 
Example: wartime  “Postponed” births 
do not occur 
Other process in 
which declines 
in rates at 
younger ages 
are linked with 
rising rates at 
older ages 
Example: a shift to 
older ages in the 
opportunities and 
incentives to have 
children that occurs 
over the medium-
term 
   
 
 
Postponement 
does not 
occur 
No such process  Factors influencing 
trends at younger 
and older ages are 
independent 
No postponement, 
no links between 
trends at different 
ages, no rise at older 
ages 
If the pattern of change in the rates, alone, is not, in itself, evidence of a postponement 
phenomenon, how can we establish the presence or absence of postponement in particular 
cases? One approach – a traditional one in social science – would be to seek questionnaire 
survey data. In order to account for change through time, a survey would have to be 
conducted at two or more time-points or ideally a sequence of such surveys about 5 years 
apart. Along with details of fertility history, we would ask direct questions of women and/or 
men and/or couples about whether they were postponing childbearing. Whether such 
questions would be well understood by respondents would, in itself, be a substantively 
interesting issue – there being a long history in fertility research of respondent difficulty in 
answering questions around fertility desires and intentions. Let us suppose that the questions 
were clearly understood and well answered. What we would expect, if postponement were 
responsible for the decline in rates at younger ages, is an increase across the time-interval in 
the proportions of the younger age groups who said they were postponing childbearing. We   9
would seek here a gross rather than a net effect since the postponement hypothesis relates to 
gross (aggregate) fertility change. That is, an increase would have to be observed in the 
overall proportion of the younger age groups who say they are postponing childbearing rather 
than in the proportion postponing "net of other factors". If the scale of the increase in this 
proportion were consistent with the change in age-parity specific fertility rates, we would 
have evidence that was at minimum consistent with the postponement hypothesis at younger 
ages. On the other hand, if there were no such increase, the plausibility of the postponement 
hypothesis would suffer. At older ages, a longitudinal component would be necessary to the 
study design. For this purpose we require a minimum of three time points, t 1 t2 and t3. We 
would expect to find, under the postponement hypothesis, that in older age groups, increases 
between t2 and t3 in age-parity specific birth rates are confined to those who stated at t 1 and t 2, 
respectively (when younger) that they were postponing or deferring childbearing. Again, this 
should be a gross rather than a net effect. If the increase between t2 and t3 in rates at older ages 
were independent of postponement status at younger ages or inconsistently or only weakly 
related, then the evidence would be inconsistent with the proposition that individual deferral 
was a correct and complete interpretation of the observed differential movements by age in 
the rates.  
Were the collection of such evidence to be contemplated, a variety of ancillary hypotheses 
could no doubt be specified to accompany these outline predictions, and the precise way in 
which the occurrence of postponement might be identified in questionnaire data could be a 
matter both of conceptual elaboration and of preliminary technical field tests. Various 
refinements and revisions could be anticipated: for example, if the survey evidence were 
against the idea, the argument could be advanced that postponement is not necessarily 
something that individuals are aware of, that it is a subconscious process and so could be   10 
difficult to identify via direct questions. Perhaps, it might be suggested, postponement at a 
particular time-point would be better operationalised as occurring when individuals say that 
they intend to have a birth later but not soon and so on, or as the difference between the 
strength of intentions to have a birth within a relatively short and a relatively long time 
period. Discussion of this kind could eventually refine the measurement of postponement and, 
at a minimum, investigate its feasibility. Whatever the outcome, the issue would be an 
empirical one. Well-designed studies of this kind whose findings were interpreted with care, 
might reveal whether postponement is a sensible concept and could in principle be the 
mechanism underlying recent trends. While we have discussed the issue here largely in terms 
of postponement, the same considerations apply to the interpretation of recent fertility trends 
as “delay” or “deferral”. Essentially these are similar if not identical concepts to 
postponement, and just as direct evidence is lacking on postponement as an explanation for 
recent fertility trends, neither delay nor deferral – which also imply an underlying behavioural 
process – have yet been precisely operationalised when it comes to mechanisms underlying 
recent age-specific fertility trends. To the best of our knowledge, survey data and analyses of 
the kind specified here as suitable for investigating the reality or otherwise of the 
postponement idea are not available and so the validity of the postponement idea cannot be 
evaluated by means of direct, follow-up survey data. In the absence of direct observations in 
the form of responses to survey questions, we adopt in this paper an indirect approach to 
evaluating the postponement idea, the details of which are presented in a later section. We 
start by giving details of the data source used here and by outlining the recent history of 
fertility in France.   11 
Data 
Age specific fertility rates are computed by the French national institute of Statistics (INSEE), 
and series are now available for the entire 20th century (Daguet 2002). Unfortunately, vital 
registration sources do not allow parity-specific fertility rates to be obtained: birth order is not 
accurately registered by the civil registration system, and estimates of the female population 
are not available specific by parity of woman. To fill this gap, INSEE has, since 1962, 
conducted a one-percent survey of fertility and family history as an integral part of the census. 
One enumerator out of 50 distributes with the census forms an additional form including 
questions on fertility and partnership histories. Before 1982, only married or formerly married 
women, aged 18 to 64, were asked to complete this form. At the 1982 and 1990 censuses, all 
women aged 18 to 64, irrespective of their marital status, were asked to participate. The most 
recent census in France took place in 1999. On that occasion, the fertility and family survey 
was largely redesigned. The sample was enlarged: men were included in the sample (some 
enumerators distributed bulletins to men, other to women); no upper age limit was applied: 
235,000 women and 145,000 men completed a form, the response rate reaching 79%. Apart 
from fertility and marriage histories, questions were asked on adopted and stepchildren and 
unmarried partnerships as well as marriages; a set of questions was devoted to the languages 
customarily spoken within the family (Cassan, Héran, Toulemon 2000). This survey allows us 
to compute age- and parity-specific rates for the period 1946 to 1998 (Toulemon and Mazuy 
2001). We use here primarily age-specific first birth rates, for the years 1946-98. We use only 
data collected from women born in 1911 and later (35 years old in 1946, 88 in 1999).  
The age-specific fertility rates generated from the 1999 Family Survey have been validated 
against national vital registration rates and found to be very close (Mazuy and Toulemon 
2001). In some cases, the age-parity specific rates are based on fairly small samples and so   12 
subject to substantial sampling error, especially at higher ages where relatively few women 
are still childless, and among older cohorts with fewer survivors (50% of women born in 1919 
are still alive in 1999). The rates were smoothed by means of a three-year moving average.  
The setting: recent fertility trends in France 
Figures 2a and 2b set the scene in the French context and present time series of age-specific 
fertility rates for France 1940-2000 at selected ages 18-42. We see that during the 1950s and 
1960s, fertility rates were, on the whole, moving in the same direction at each age. From 
about the mid 1970s, however, the rates diverge – at younger ages they continue the decline 
begun in the late 1960s, while at older ages, they level off and begin to rise. The divergence 
seen here in French rates from the mid 1970s onwards is common to developed countries 
generally and is what is interpreted very widely as reflecting postponement or delay of 
childbearing.  
Since what is usually meant by delayed childbearing is, in fact, deferral of the start of 
childbearing, we focus in this paper particularly on the transition to first birth. Unconditional 
and parity-specific first birth rates are considered in turn. Unconditional first birth rates (taux 
de deuxième catégorie in French demographic terminology) are first births per 1000 women 
of all parities, while conditional, or parity-specific, first birth rates (taux de première 
catégorie) are first births per 1000 childless women (those of parity 0); in each case, the rates 
used here are age-specific. Trends in unconditional first birth rates by age are presented in 
Figure 3 and show even more clearly than the overall age specific rates the diverging trends at 
younger and older ages – the boundary between them being about age 26 – during the period 
since the mid 1970s. Figure 4 presents the same data as Figure 3 expressed as a ratio of 1974-  13 
76 values and displays clearly the differential trends in first birth rates by age since the mid 
1970s.  
Differential shifts by age in unconditional first birth rates are, however, not in themselves 
evidence of postponement, however that term is defined, in that they do not necessarily reflect 
change in propensities – that is the probability among the childless of having a first birth. For 
the idea of postponement to have meaning, it must entail that first birth rates among those at 
risk of a first birth – the childless – decline at younger ages and subsequently rise at older 
ages among those at risk of such a birth – again, those who are childless. However a decline 
in unconditional first birth rates at younger ages could in principle be followed later by a rise 
at older ages in unconditional first birth rates that was due purely to the increase in the 
numbers at risk of a first birth at older ages, resulting from the earlier decline in unconditional 
first birth rates at younger ages, rather than to a rise in first birth rates among childless women 
at older ages. If this were the case, the combination of the two trends could not be interpreted 
as reflecting underlying postponement, since the only propensity to have changed is the 
probability of first birth at younger ages. In the light of these points, do the rises at older ages 
in Figures 3 and 4 reflect anything more than increases in the proportion at risk of a first birth 
at older ages resulting from declines in first birth rates at younger ages? Figures 5-7 reveal 
that they do: change in denominators at older ages is not the whole story since the upward 
trend in first birth rates among older women is due both to rising propensities to have a first 
birth at older ages and to rising proportions at risk of such a birth. The first birth rates of 
childless women have been rising at older ages (above about 28) in recent decades and, like 
the unconditional rates, the parity specific (conditional) first birth rates have been diverging at 
younger vs older ages since the mid-1970s, though the divide between them occurs at a 
slightly later age in the case of conditional than unconditional rates (Figure 5). Figure 6   14 
presents the changes in the parity-specific rates in relative terms – relative to 1974-76 – while 
Figure 7 shows trends in the proportions childless by age. Thus, a change occurred subsequent 
to the mid 1970s in the age pattern of the propensity of childless women to have a birth or, 
alternatively put, in the age pattern to the start of childbearing. The net result of these recent 
trends is that the age-pattern of the onset of childbearing has changed. This is seen in Figure 8 
which shows period schedules of age-specific first birth rates for selected years, both 
unconditional and parity-specific. Both sets of rates display in the last couple of decades 
much the same shift towards older ages that has occurred in the overall fertility schedule by 
age
3. Can this complex of changes be ascribed to postponement? 
As noted earlier, a natural social science approach to identifying the operation of a 
behavioural mechanism such as postponement would be to survey individuals about their 
attitudes and intentions. In the absence of such data, we seek evidence in the age-parity 
specific rates themselves – and specifically in the age specific birth rates of childless women. 
What internal relations would be expected in such time series if a process corresponding to 
the postponement idea is in operation? Two criteria can be specified by which a postponement 
phenomenon might be identified, both instances of what can be described statistically as 
negative feedback. If women or couples have in recent decades been increasingly putting off 
childbearing at younger ages with the intention of having children later, two predictions can 
be made. A first prediction is that the cumulative proportions having had a birth of a 
particular order by age x in year t should be negatively associated with conditional birth rates 
of that order in year t. Applied to the start of childbearing, we expect that the fewer women 
who, in year t, have had a first birth by age x, the higher the expected first birth rate among 
childless women aged x in year t. This is because a postponement phenomenon should result 
                                                   
3 In fact, almost the entire shift in the age pattern of childbearing in the last few decades in France is attributable 
to the changing age pattern of first birth (Toulemon and Mazuy 2001).    15 
in (1) an increase in the proportions at older ages who have not have a first birth and (2) an 
increase in the proportions of the childless at older ages who nevertheless intend to have a 
first birth because they have put it off at younger ages and finally (3) an increase in the first 
birth rates of older childless women. Postponement, as a behavioural phenomenon, need not 
have all three of these consequences. For example, we can envisage circumstances in which 
women at younger ages “put off” the start of childbearing, but that when they reached older 
ages no longer wished to have a child. However, if deferred childbearing is the correct 
explanation for the differential trends in age specific fertility we have been seeing in 
developed countries, all three consequences would have to follow. A second prediction from 
the postponement hypothesis is that we would expect that declines in age-parity specific 
fertility rates at a particular period would be associated with increases, some years later, in 
age-parity specific rates. In the case of the first birth, we would expect that the first 
differences in the fertility rates of childless women aged x in year t should be negatively 
associated with first differences in the corresponding rates at age x+d in year t+d, where d is 
the time interval over which the delay occurs. However, whether this prediction is correct 
depends on how the process of postponement occurs in the aggregate – for example, that year 
on year the proportion of women of any given age who postpone a birth begins by being quite 
small but increases gradually. Various qualifications could be introduced here which depend 
essentially on the precise process of change, thus illustrating that, to be useful and testable, 
the idea of postponement needs to be specified in greater detail. We focus particularly on the 
transition to first birth, since it is a crucial stage in individuals’ fertility histories and also 
because the start of childbearing is what most commentary on delayed childbearing, implicitly 
or explicitly, appears to have in mind.   16 
The proportions childless and conditional first birth rates 
Figure 9 displays the joint path, year by year, of the proportions childless and the conditional 
first birth rate, for selected ages between 20-38. The points plotted are distinguished by sub-
period: 1946-60, 1960-79 and 1980-98. The sub-periods have been chosen somewhat 
arbitrarily but the first of them corresponds to the immediate post-war baby-boom, the second 
to the subsequent fertility decline, and the most recent to the period when the age pattern of 
childbearing has been changing. If negative feedback occurs these plots should slow a 
positive slope – that is, the higher the proportion childless, the higher the age-specific first 
birth rate among women of parity 0. Such a relationship might hold either in general, across 
the time period as a whole or during delimited sub-sets of the overall period if, for example, a 
postponement or negative feedback mechanism were operating during only a subsection of 
the overall period. We see that at ages under 28, the relationship between childlessness and 
the first birth rates of zero-parity women is negative rather than positive. The negative slope is 
largely due to, though not confined to, the most recent period and probably reflects the impact 
of recent first birth rates at young ages on survivorship – that is, since first birth rates at young 
ages have been declining, the proportions childless at those ages have, as a result, been rising 
since survivorship is a function of previous years’ conditional first birth rates. Such an effect 
will be much less important at older ages because of the cumulative effect of first birth rates 
at younger ages. While the patterns at older ages are less clear-cut, the plots do indeed tend to 
have a positive slope, as would be predicted from the postponement hypothesis. Product 
moment correlations at these ages between the proportion childless and the conditional first 
birth rate are moderate to high positive during 1946-60 and 1980-98, but mainly negative in 
1960-79. At ages 30-38, the correlations range between .35 and .94 in 1946-60,  -.7  .43 in 
1960-80, and  .55 to .87 during 1980-98. The age-specific correlations are set out in Figure   17 
10, for the 1946-98 period as a whole, and for sub-periods. There is, thus, some statistical 
evidence of negative feedback during the immediate post-war period and also in the most 
recent period: the proportions childless and the propensity of childless women to have a first 
birth are moderately positively related. But this relation is not present during the whole 
period: between 1960 and 1980 it does not hold; during that period the rates at ages above 30 
began to increase while the proportion childless were declining.  
That this criterion should produce evidence of negative feedback immediately after the second 
world war suggests that it may well be a reasonable one. Though they do not always have this 
effect, wars are known to disrupt childbearing in a population in a way that probably 
constitutes the clearest case of postponement in action. Births that would ordinarily have 
taken place during the war years do not occur because of civil disruption, and there is a 
subsequent bulge in births.  
Our findings are in some respects similar to those of Rindfuss et al (1988, Table 4) whose 
analyses reveal a negative association between proportions childless and conditional first birth 
rates at younger ages, and a slight positive relationship at older ages, though the latter is not 
significant and also emerges only when period factors are controlled for. Our findings are also 
not dissimilar to those of Bosveld who found that in a range of European countries between 
1980 and 1992 the proportion childless and conditional first birth rates vary inversely at age 
26, but that at age 31 there is more evidence of a direct relationship between proportions 
childless and conditional first birth rates. The pattern is by no means uniform – France, 
Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands conform to it but West Germany, Italy and some East 
European countries do not. At age 37, the picture is different again (Bosveld, 1996, Figure 
8.2). However, our findings suggest that such associations may be confined to specific time-
periods and the relevant period could vary between countries.    18 
Correlations between lagged first differences  
Since what evidence we have of a positive relationship between the proportions childless and 
the conditional first birth rates is strongest in the later part of the period, data on the 
relationship between the lagged first differences in the conditional first birth rates is presented 
here for the most recent period only. If declines in conditional first birth rates at younger ages 
were being compensated for by increases in these rates at older ages we would expect that the 
lagged first differences would be negatively correlated, particularly at those ages – under 28 – 
at which the sharpest declines in first birth rates were occurring since the mid 1970s. Figure 
11 shows the correlations at each age between the first differences (i.e. annual change) in the 
conditional first birth rates at age x in year t (dfx,t) and those at age x+d in year t+d (dfx+d,t+d) 
for ages 17-37 and lags (d) of 1 to 6 years, during the period 1975-98. One can think of these 
either as lagged period relationships or as intra-cohort correlations, since those aged x in t and 
x+d in t+d are the same birth cohort of women. The plots reveal little or no tendency for these 
correlations to be systematically negative at younger ages, though at lag 5, low negative 
correlations appear at ages 21-26
4. These data thus provide little evidence that declines in 
conditional first birth rates at younger ages are at all linked to rises in rates at older ages, or 
indeed at any age. Essentially, little or no pattern is evident. However, the type of mechanism 
that would give rise to such a direct link would have to be a very simple one, and more 
complex mechanisms giving rise to some other form of negative feedback could be envisaged. 
While there is some suggestion of negative feedback in recent decades in relation to the 
proportions childless, the second criterion reveals little evidence of it. It may be that the 
dataset used is not large enough to provide sufficiently precise measures of first differences, 
                                                   
4 The rates from which the first differences are obtained were smoothed using a 3-point moving average. The 
smoothing has the effect of raising the correlations of first differences at lag 1 by an average of about 0.2 by 
comparison with those obtained from the unsmoothed values. Thus the by and large positive values shown for   19 
and thus that the correlations between lagged first differences contain a lot of random error. 
Our search for evidence of negative feedback in the form of negative correlations between 
lagged differences within cohorts may also have been unfruitful because the macro-level 
phenomenon of “postponement” could appear at longer lags if the process of delay is spread 
across several ages. 
Our two criteria of postponement are not altogether in agreement. Given the widespread 
currency of the idea of postponement, it is perhaps surprising that the evidence for negative 
feedback is not stronger. More formal time-series methods might possibly be helpful in 
investigating further the empirical basis for the postponement idea. But using more refined 
methods (or looking for relations at longer lags) would require the construction of long time 
series, and would involve assuming that the relation we are trying to identify is stable. 
Fertility trends during the 20th century present both practical and theoretical difficulties in 
this respect. We have only begun to scratch the surface of this issue. A large number of 
questions arise. For example, it is conceivable that compensating movements in fertility that 
are due to postponement can be identified retrospectively but not foreseen prospectively, just 
as the weather can be better explained retrospectively than predicted prospectively. If that is 
the case, then their occurrence would have little or no practical value in anticipating future 
trends though the postponement idea would still retain scientific utility and have an 
explanatory role
5. Note that criteria of postponement that we have adopted here are, strictly 
speaking, merely a way of identifying a statistical link between declining rates at younger 
ages and rising rates at older ages; we would ex pect such a link to be found if postponement is 
occurring, but if they are present they need not be due to postponement - they could result 
                                                                                                                                                             
lag 1 may be to some extent an artefact. However, at lags of 2 and above, smoothing has a minimal effect on the 
correlations, and so it is unlikely that the correlations are biased.    20 
from some other process, such as a shift in the overall age distribution of childbearing. Hence, 
the positive correlations between proportions childless and first birth rates among childless 
women in the last two decades do not prove that postponement has been taking place, though 
they are consistent with such a process. The occurrence or otherwise of postponement cannot 
be established from the behaviour of the rates alone – it requires, in addition, evidence of the 
social, economic and cultural factors influencing fertility movements at varying ages, as well 
as longitudinal information on intentions. Ultimately, the postponement hypothesis is a causal 
one, and could be extremely difficult to substantiate in full, though its status could certainly 
be subject to more thorough empirical testing.  
To elaborate a little further on how differential movements in fertility rates by age might be 
generated, some hypothetical scenarios maybe useful. 
1.  Postponement might operate as follows: some causal agent F1 becomes operative 
which has the effect of reducing younger women’s desire for (a) birth(s) in the short 
term while encouraging them to plan to have (a) birth(s) in the medium to long term, 
when they are older, in such a way that their intentions remain firm and are fairly 
insensitive to future conditions. 
2.  An alternative is a causal agent F1a which works just as in scenario 1 but that 
women/couples are very sensitive to future conditions. Whether this should be 
described as postponement is a matter of opinion – we think not, since the likelihood 
that future births will “make up” for the births that did not occur at younger ages is 
highly dependent on future economic and social circumstances. 
                                                                                                                                                             
5See Lieberson and Lynn (2002) who argue that just as evolutionary theory has little predictive power and is 
largely given to explaining past events, so capacity to predict future events is both  an inappropriate criterion of 
the success of a social science explanation or theory and an inappropriate objective for the social sciences.    21 
3.  Another scenario which may or may not be termed postponement could be as follows: 
a causal agent F2 becomes operative, either suddenly or gradually, which has the 
effect that younger women no longer have the opportunity to have (a) birth(s) in the 
short term, but has no impact or perhaps increases fertility desires/opportunities when 
they are older. There is no question of decision-making here – the option simply 
disappeared at younger ages.  
4.  A further scenario, which certainly does not involve postponement in any sense is that 
causal factor F3 comes into play, again slowly or all at once, which reduces the 
fertility desires and intentions of young women and that a quite unrelated factor F4 
occurs around the same time which has the effect of increasing the fertility 
desires/intentions or opportunities of older women. In this case, the diverging trends at 
younger and older ages have independent and unrelated causes, and postponement 
cannot be said to be the cause of the diverging trends by age. 
5.  Finally, the entire structure by age of incentives and disincentives to childbearing may 
change over the medium to long term so that the age pattern of childbearing shifts to 
older ages.  
Attempting to set out the detail of the process in this way emphasises that we need to think 
harder about and gather more information on the link between fertility intentions/plans, 
decisions (active or passive) to have a child in a particular year, and external, macro-level 
causal factors that vary through calendar time. With greater clarification and precision of this 
kind, we could expect to advance our understanding of time-trends in fertility and the forces 
that drive them.   22 
We conclude with a practical issue of current interest. Fertility rates at ages under 25 in 
France have stabilised, are no longer declining and may even be rising (see Figure 1). If what 
has been happening in the last 20 or so years in France is a postponement phenomenon, and 
that the rises in fertility rates at older ages are entirely due to the declines at younger ages, 
then we might predict that rates at older ages will in a few years’ time stop rising. However, if 
postponement is not the reason for the rising rates at later ages, or not the entire reason, such a 
prediction would be unfounded and we would not predict an end to the rising rates at older 
ages. The evidence examined here is not sufficient to allow either prediction to be defended 
empirically. 
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Figure 1. Period age-specific fertility schedules, France, selected years, 1948-98 
a. Births per 1000 women  
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
1948
1958
1968
1978
1988
1998
Age
Year
 
b. Standardised (to sum to 1) 
0
0,01
0,02
0,03
0,04
0,05
0,06
0,07
0,08
0,09
15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
1948
1958
1968
1978
1988
1998
Age
Year
 
Source: Daguet, 2002.    25 
Figure 2. Age-specific fertility rates, selected ages. France 1940-2000 
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Source: Daguet, 2002   26 
Figure 3. Unconditional first birth rates, selected ages, France 1946-98 
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Source: Ined-Insee, 1999  Family History Survey   27 
Figure 4. Ratio of unconditional first birth rates to average of 1974-76,  
selected ages, France 1946-98.  
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Source: Ined-Insee, 1999  Family History Survey   28 
Figure 5. Conditional first birth rates, selected ages, France 1946-98 
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Source: Ined-Insee, 1999  Family History Survey   29 
Figure 6. Ratio of conditional first birth rates to average of 1974-76,  
selected ages, France 1946-98. 
a. Ages 18 to 30 
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
18
20
22
24
26
28
30
Age
Year
 
b. Ages 30 to 42 
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
30
32
34
36
38
40
42
Age
Year
 
Source: Ined-Insee, 1999  Family History Survey   30 
Figure 7. Proportion of childless women, selected ages, France 1946-98  
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Source: Ined-Insee, 1999  Family History Survey   31 
Figure 8. Unconditional and conditional first birth rates by age, selected years 
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Source: Ined-Insee, 1999  Family History Survey   32 
Figure 9. Joint time path of conditional first birth rates (per 1000)  
and proportion childless (per 1000), selected ages, France 1946-98 
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Source: Ined-Insee, 1999  Family History Survey   33 
Figure 9. Joint time path of conditional first birth rates (per 1000)  
and proportion childless (per 1000), selected ages, France 1946-98 
b. Ages 30 to 38 
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Source: Ined-Insee, 1999  Family History Survey   34 
Figure 10. Age-specific correlations between conditional first birth rates  
and proportion childless, selected periods, France 1946-98  
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Source: Ined-Insee, 1999  Family History Survey   35 
Figure 11. Correlations between the lagged first differences in conditional age specific first 
birth rates, lags 1 to 6, selected ages, France 1975-98 
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Source: Ined-Insee, 1999  Family History Survey 
 